Th is study off ers a discussion of the dangers to the stability of political systems in consolidated democracies posed by contemporary populism, with a particular focus on the dynamic development of extreme right-wing populism. Th e author considers the consequences of effi cient populist campaigns, such as Brexit in Great Britain, lowered trust towards the United States under Trump's administration and practices followed by the Law and Justice party (PiS) under the leadership of Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland, which seem especially destructive for liberal democracy. Further examples are those of Hungary and Turkey, where the political systems have eroded into semi-consolidated democracy in the case of the former and an authoritarian system in the latter case. A comparative analysis of freedom indices indicates some dangers related to de-consolidation of the democratic system in Poland. Furthermore, the study points out dangers arising from the transformation of soft populism, understood as communication rhetoric oriented towards the concentration of power in the hands of populist leaders, which clearly paves the way for the dismantling of consolidated democracy in favour of an authoritarian system. Th e conclusions of the study outlines a variety of actions which can be undertaken to protect the achievements of liberal democracy.
Introduction and methodology
Political competition and the attendant alternation of power is a crucial feature of the political system in consolidated democracy. Legal principles, which defi ne the political system of the state, are guarded by an independent judiciary system, in compliance with the separation-of-powers principle defi ned by Montesquieu, and supported by the fourth estate -free media. Th e sources of inspiration for the rule of law systems in Western consolidated democracies can be found in diff erent periods of history: Ancient Greece and Rome, the Age of Enlightenment, the political transformations of the twentieth century, including the interwar period, seen as a harbinger of liberal democracy, a system that reached its heyday in Western countries aft er the Second World War, and in Central European countries -aft er 1989. In the history of the Western World, free democratic systems with their wide range of civil liberties and universal suff rage have not developed without disruptions, and nor have they always been awaited. Liberal democratic political systems in Western countries have not been homogenous, and they have taken various forms. What constitutes their liberal and democratic foundations is respect for the separation of powers, civil liberties, equality of citizens before the law, freedom of speech and economic freedom. Th ese liberties underlie the democratic rule of law, but they do not make up the full list.
Th e aim of this study is to analyse the infl uence of extreme right-wing populism on the freedom of the political system in a particular state. It is based on the assumption that the system of consolidated democracy is a liberal democracy with its democratic rule of law. Depending on the degree of freedom and the level of its restrictions, diff erent political systems can be classifi ed into the following categories: consolidated democracy, semi-consolidated democracy, hybrid regime, semi-consolidated authoritarian regime, and, in the most extreme cases, consolidated authoritarian regime. 2 Th is study aims to off er some answers to the following research questions: What are the factors behind the dynamic development of contemporary populism ? What is the potential impact of extreme right-wing populism on the political sys-tems of consolidated democracies ? Is liberal democracy and the democratic rule of law coming to an end ? What action should be undertaken by defenders of consolidated democracies in order to reduce negative consequences of populism ?
Th e analysis of threats to the stability of political systems in consolidated democracies which are posed by contemporary populism considers the experience of British democracy in view of the results of the Brexit referendum and the process of leaving the EU as well as American challenges which obviously come with the administration of Donald Trump.
Th e comparative analysis off ered here is also based on the examples of Hungary and Turkey, where the political systems have eroded into semi-consolidated democracy in the case of the former and an authoritarian system in the latter case. Th e case of Poland is particularly emphasised in the study; it is a country which until recently has been pursuing its systemic transformation, has successfully adapted liberal democracy and has set an example for other states. However, since the Law and Justice party (PiS), a right-wing populist formation led by Jarosław Kaczyński, came to power, the country has been pushed onto the path previously marked by Hungary.
Th e qualitative analysis of facts and consequences of the rule of right-wing populists is supported by a comparative analysis of freedom indices provided by the Freedom House organisation, which every year quantifi es a number of key areas that defi ne the components of political systems in countries all over the world. Th e qualitative part of the study is supported by an analysis of dangers stemming from the transformation of soft populism, understood as a communicative rhetoric oriented towards the concentration of power in the hands of populist leaders. Th e conclusions of the study outline a variety of possible actions which can be undertaken in order to protect the achievements of liberal democracy.
Literature review
Populism is not a new phenomenon in the history of Western civilisation. In Hellenic philosophy, it is possible to observe an awareness of seemingly natural changeability of forms of government and attendant political doctrines (Piskozub 2003, 20) . Although in his concept of a cycle of forms of government Plato (Plato 2016) does not mention populism, his observations on the oscillation between the extreme manifestations of those forms allows us to identify a degenerated type of democracy known as ochlocracy, a transitional form which can be most frequently observed between democracy and anarchy ( Figure 1 ). Source: the author's own study, based on the Hellenic concept of a political cycle and its corresponding spiritual attitudes (Piskozub 2003, 20; Kahn 1980, 57) Th e term ochlocracy comes from the Greek word ochlos, which refers to poor, common people (Hansen 1999, 66, 399) . Viewed from the perspective of creators of the rule of law based on the principle of direct democracy, the term ochlos was not a synonym of demos (which referred to all Athenian people and the state of Athens), nor was it associated with a positively perceived rule of the people defi ned by the term demokratia. As can be observed in literature, democrats have always identifi ed the notion of ochlos with such negative terms as "mob" or "crowd". By contrast, critics of existing democracy who had the ambition to claim power used the notion of ochlos as a synonym of demos. In that way, they identifi ed their own group as Hellenic citizens rightfully contesting the existing authorities. Since then, such an attitude has been appealing to the next generations of populists.
In his analysis of populism, Adrian Kuzminski (Kuzminski 2008) identifi es its positive aspects: the populist agenda comes as a direct answer to political and economic faults of the existing system. He also points out the bankruptcy of our unrep-resentative system of governance: a plutocratic oligarchy reinforced by the manipulation of general elections and referenda which claim to be "democratic". According to Kuzminski, "populism holds out the hope of dissolving, peacefully and over the time, the domineering personal and corporate concentrations of wealth and political power that characterize our society, so as to free and advance, rather than hinder and exploit, the private energies of labour, talent, and ambition" (Kuzminski 2008, 17) . Such an interpretation of populism captures its contemporary ideas and its previous types, which aimed to implement some utopian ideas of common equality under the slogans of "power to the people". Th e most extreme example of severely distorted implementation of the idea of equality was the fate of people who lived under communist rule in the twentieth century. It should be noted that communist countries oft en defi ned their governance systems as "democratic" (suffi ce it to mention such names as the German Democratic Republic or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). Th ey willingly applied a nationalist and populist form to pseudo-socialist contents. Regardless of attempts to dignify populist movements, the term is oft en used in a pejorative sense.
Th e vicious circle of the cyclical triumph of populism is emphasised by economists Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991, 7 -13) . In his research studies on the countries of South America and South Africa, David Fowkes identifi es economic factors as the crucial ones in the process of falling into a trap of populism. He also points out some normative implications and attendant dangers, and observes that "populism is problematic because it produces institutional and economic damage in predictable ways" (Fowkes 2011) . Th e positive heroes of Fawkes' analysis that have successfully avoided the trap of populism are Brazil and South Africa, which implemented a relatively reasonable economic policy. Unfortunately, the story does not end with this study: in 2018 the election campaign in Brazil brought victory to a die-hard populist, Jair Bolsonaro. Considering a certain cyclicality of the rise of populism discussed by Dornbusch and Edwards, we can assume that it comes as an uncomfortable but probable form, which is conducive to alternation of power or its seizure in democratic systems.
It is impossible to pinpoint one crucial reason which could explain a serious stumble of the seemingly well-established system of liberal democratic states that we can witness today. Th e current crisis of liberal democracy and democratic rule of law can be attributed to such phenomena as adaptive diffi culties that some social groups have experienced under the conditions of advancing globalisation. It seems that what dealt a blow to the liberal systems in the 2010s was a combination of independent processes and inspired activity. Th e challenges faced by liberal democracies can be divided into three levels: (1) meta-level -social and economic inequalities stemming from globalisation; subsidisation of selected sectors (e.g. agriculture) at the expense of economies of third countries (leading to their degradation); job insecurity resulting from the relocation of industry and services; distortion of the fi nancial system (which has become separated from the material value) leading to economic crises, e.g. in 2008; (2) macro-state level -relatively low alternation of power and limited possibilities of pursuing social activity by non-establishment groups; exhaustion of the elites, their persistence in power and some cases of corruption generating additional lack of trust in the political system; pauperisation of activists and their further radicalisation; (3) micro-local level -crises and exclusion of peripheral societies and economies; diff erent, oft en low levels of education in peripheral regions; disproportionally strong infl uence of extreme ideologies or religious factions which are negatively oriented towards the system of the democratic rule of law and liberal democracy.
A system characteristic of Western countries of the second half of the twentieth century, liberal democracy has faced the populist challenge in the 2010s. Political theoreticians and philosophers point out a diffi cult partnership of liberal and democratic concepts (Bobbio 1987) . Th ey also stress the primacy of liberal values over the democratic principle: while liberal values must be democratic by defi nition, democracy, boiled down to casting a vote, can function without the civil liberties off ered by the liberal system. It follows that demos does not necessarily have to be liberal. Quite the opposite, demos can be brutal, reactionary and oriented towards the exclusion of others (Mann 2005; Schmitt 1985, 9) .
Contemporary political, social and economic diff erences in Western societies are oft en associated with globalisation, which has been growing stronger since the mid-1990s. Criticism of globalisation and a growing rebellion against open and liberal economy have become common elements in various contestation movements. Critics of globalisation based on liberal economic values blame it for the stratifi cation of societies and an ongoing decline of the middle class, which so far has been the agent of social cohesion. Christophe Guilluy (Guilluy 2018) states that "Western people have been falling apart into two worlds: those at the top and those at the bottom, the wealthy and the poor, the contented and the unhappy, the cosmopolitans and those who are strongly set in their environment, the mobile and the settled, those who are progressive, open and -it is impossible to avoid that terrible wordthose who are populists" (aft er Leick 2018) .
Contestation movements, including populism, which can be understood in such terms to a certain extent, can function as a legitimate channel for expressing the needs of groups who are somehow socially excluded (Ben-Ami 2016; Kozłowski 2008 Kozłowski , 2010 . Th e indignation of the excluded can be expressed in various forms and with various levels of intensity. It can be a simple vote for a party which eagerly criticises the condition of the state and the social and economic condition of the electorate (a famous slogan of the PiS party: "Poland is in ruin", used during the 2015 general elections), but it can also be a violent social protest involving street riots, as could be observed in the case of the yellow-vest movement in France at the turn of 2018 and 2019.
Th e explicit identifi cation of transitional forms of populism is hindered by the lack of clearly exclusive features of populist movements. However, some common characteristics of such formations can be observed in Western countries on both sides of the Atlantic. According to John B. Judis, a defi nition of American or European populism cannot be limited to the traditional division into the rightwing, the left -wing and the centrists. American and European populists operate using ideology to a lesser extent, as they more oft en refer to the political logic of taking advantage of opportunities and contexts to gain support for their slogans and activities. From this perspective, left -wing populism does not aim to overthrow the capitalist order but to fi nd its own place in that system. Judis believes that the central aspect of left -wing populist movements is their orientation on the division into "the people" and "the elite"; right-wing populism, in turn, is oriented on the division into "the people", "the elite" and the third group -allegedly preferred by the elites -immigrants (Judis 2016).
From contestation to right-wing populism
Although racism, hostility towards immigrants and disdain for liberal democracy are common features of American and European populisms (and are sometimes declared with pride), we can observe some signifi cant diff erences between them. Paul Krugman writes that European populism is "at least partly real", whereas Trumpist populism turns out to be "entirely fake, a scam sold to working-class voters who are in for a rude awakening" (Krugman 2016) . European populists implement solutions which, to some extent, can be taken at their face value -they can meet the expectations of socially excluded groups. Let us just mention those introduced in Poland: the so-called 500+ programme, a cash benefi t scheme for all children under eighteen (which was, however, not available to the fi rst child in the family -this issue has been left as a bargaining power for the next parliamentary election and introduced few months beforehand appropriately), an increase in the minimum wage, a partial ban on Sunday trading, and a lowering of the retirement age. Welfare-state programmes are also on the agenda of other populist parties in Europe, for example the National Front in France (of course, the state is only supposed to take care of "proper" citizens who match all the declared ideological slogans). By contrast, Trump's populism -declared under the slogan "Make America great again" -actually cares for rich citizens. At present, America has been taking advantage of favourable economic conditions, as refl ected by a number of economic indices; however, the open theatres of the trade war have not yet brought any measurable results for the populist proletariat. Th e reversal of the health-insurance programme implemented by Barack Obama's administration will undoubtedly result in the exclusion of millions of American people from the health-insurance system.
Referring to the very beginning of Trump's presidency, which -considering its style and actions -comes as an affi rmation of populism, Robert Singh points out its destructive potential. Discussing the looming danger, he introduces a "defl a-tionary" interpretation of Trump's populism (Singh 2017) . He provides three arguments: fi rstly, Trump's populism is ambiguously fl exible. Trump confi rms populist principles but the application of such principles is insuffi cient to describe Trump. Th e American president "illustrates its capacious adaptability and thinly fl uid normative content that functions as an artefact of whatever ideological prefi x is attached. " Secondly, populism is a necessary but insuffi cient condition for Trump's critical involvement, both in terms of populism in elections and populism in power. "Structural accounts exaggerating Trump's signifi cance as vanguard of a transnational awakening misinterpret surface similarities and temporal coincidences" of the rise of some similar "arguers". Th irdly, Singh believes that "the constitutional threat of Trump in power is less than meets his ubiquitous 'I' . Democratic deconsolidation cannot be discounted. "
Once in power, populists do not abandon the strategy applied during the fi ght for it. Th ey continue to stir a sense of danger, present themselves not as winners but as victims, mobilise voters to stay vigilant, and foster the polarisation of the public opinion. Th ese tactics come as a cover and can lead to the gradual dismantling of a liberal democratic system, which is sometimes referred to as a "crawling coup d' état". Th e consecutive stages of the scenario are as follows: "colonisation" of public institutions, mass-scale clientelism, systematic repressions and, eventually, replacement of pro-institutional offi cials with "our own people", who may be mediocre but will remain loyal. All that is done in the name of the so-called opposition to the old system. Hence, institutions of the democratic legal order are attacked: the judiciary (of all levels) and the media, both public (which can be transformed into an instrument of government propaganda) and those which are not controlled by the authorities and are critical about the government (the use of subsidies or the allocation of advertising budgets of companies controlled by the government to particular pro-government media). Moreover, as can be observed in Poland -where certain press titles are not available at petrol stations owned by government-controlled companies -also the system of press distribution can become an instrument of discrimination against independent media. Populism in power, then, is not a model plebeian populism but can be highly sophisticated in its pragmatism. Anne Applebaum (Applebaum 2019 ) observes that it is also possible to get an impression that it is mere hypocrisy. It should be, however, admitted that populism in power generously invests public money into activities which maintain its popularity or are oriented towards particular interests of groups supporting the government.
Unbidden allies of populists
Communication with and integration of socially excluded groups are certainly important, but they do not seem to fully explain the success of contestation movements. Another signifi cant factor at play here is support to new right-wing populism provided by centres oriented towards the destruction of institutions of Western countries. What should be stressed in this context is not only cyberattacks from Russia and ISIS, but also threats coming from other countries, such as North Korea or China. Russia has established a special unit which in Western countries is referred to as the Troll Factory (MacFarquhar 2018, A11). Its task is to run disinformation campaigns aiming to destabilise the European Union or its particular member states. As discovered, such campaigns were conducted in Great Britain before the Brexit referendum and in Germany, where fake news was spread in social media. In Poland, the activity of Internet haters whose posts were written in incorrect Polish (which could indicate their Russian origin) intensifi ed before the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015. In the United States, special counsel Mueller and his staff , which investigated links between the circles of President Donald Trump and Russian oligarchs, found many irregularities in this respect. 3 Although the committee did not confi rm the accusations of criminal collaboration of the Republican candidate with Russian services, it identifi ed an extraordinary amount of contacts and established facts proving their direct involvement in discrediting the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton.
Th e American election and the referendum in Great Britain were among the fi rst projects of social manipulation involving IT technologies. 4 In a sense, the application of advanced technologies and skilful use of social media amounted to a Stalinist-type operation of social engineering (Westerman 2011) -the objective was to change the political discourse, and it was successfully accomplished. Although the cases under consideration involved the use of social media, the communication method was based on a simplifi ed model of imagined social problems conjured in order to form the spirit of new right-wing populism.
Drawing attention to fake news and deliberate manipulation aiming to foster instability has increased the vigilance of regulators and institutions responsible for state protection. In 2018 the presidential election in France and the parliamentary election in Germany were of particularly high signifi cance in Europe. Although populist formations were rejected in both cases, what could not remain unnoticed was a systematic increase in their popularity.
An observation summing up contemporary populism should point out its chaotic and heterogeneous nature. It can be identifi ed as leadership populism, which is very close to semi-consolidated authoritarianism. Its various features can be traced in such various political leaders as Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Beppe Grillo, Viktor Orbán, Jarosław Kaczyński, Jeremy Corbyn or Boris Johnson. Th erefore, populism cannot be identifi ed as one consistent ideological system, one type or one element, oft en of right-wing nature. For example, in Great Britain, Corbynism includes a very strong populist component; however, in many ways, its pluralistic features are more distinctive than those observed in its opponents (Molyneux and Osborne 2017) . On the Polish political scene, a left -wing politician, Robert Biedroń, has also taken a populist-pluralist path.
Findings
As it is today, populist ideology is mainly based on nostalgia, with its idyllic image of an imagined past: "Much of the current upheaval in Europe evokes Edmund Burke's repudiation in 1790 of the French Revolution as the product of a misguided faith in ideas that defi ed people's attachment to history and tradition" (Ben-Ami 2016). Although right-wing populism in Western countries is nothing new, it has been marginalised in public life for several decades. In Central and Western Europe, it has been absent in the mainstream of political life since the 1930s. References to the rhetoric of those times can be observed in the current political discourse, which is now additionally enhanced with the specifi c language of communist newspeak used in the countries which experienced the so-called people's democracy (as is the case of speeches made by Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the PiS party, which has been in power in Poland since 2015).
Th e revival of populism should be attributed to an increased sense of threat in some Western societies which had to face an unprecedented wave of immigration in 2015. Th e fear of immigration from regions which are culturally diff erent from the West has reinforced the sense of cultural threat and it has, in a way, redefi ned nativism. A strong stress on slogans voicing the need to protect the nation, culture and religion against foreign invaders has become the common denominator for populists of various Western countries. Considering the fact that in 2015 Europe received approximately 1.5 million refugees and immigrants (mostly Muslims), of whom about a million came to Germany, it is easier to understand why new rightwing populism has become a mass-scale phenomenon. It should also be remembered that reluctance and concerns expressed by Western societies towards Muslims are related to a number of terrorist attacks conducted by Islamic extremists; let us just mention the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York (11 September 2001), on the underground in Madrid before the parliamentary election in Spain (a quick change in the public opinion contributed to the smashing victory of the right wing in 2004), on public transport and communication routes in London (in 2005 and 2017) and others. Th e fear of radical Islam has been drawing the attention of Western societies for some time, integrating various movements radically oriented towards the fi ght against cultural diff erences (not only against Islam). One clear example here is the activity of a Dutch politician, Geert Wilders, whose popularity has been constantly growing under extremely nationalistic and anti-immigrant slogans aimed against, among others, Polish people who work in the Netherlands.
Contemporary right-wing populism is characterised by the policy of isolationism and anti-globalism. European populists turned against Chancellor Angela Merkel, who was accused of running the policy of open borders in 2015, which contributed to mass immigration, presented as an invasion of Europe. Political choices of right-wing populists are not limited to personal aversion against the leader of the German government. Th ey oft en perceive the German state itself as hostile, because of the increasingly important role that it plays in the European Union. Th e self-defi nition of right-wing populism is based on the identifi cation of agents -people, states or institutions -who / which are hostile towards their ideals and, in this way, also towards their country. Hence, the European Union has become the enemy number one, and the Euro-sceptical attitude has become a point of honour for right-wing populists. However, this has never prevented anti-European members of the European Parliament from claiming their parliamentary allowances and other benefi ts. Indeed, hostile attitude towards the European Union must have been the reason why Marie Le Pen, a French presidential candidate and Member of the European Parliament, not only received allowances from the institution she hated so much, but also claimed ineligible expenses, extorting extra money from the EU budget (Strzałkowski 2017) .
Th e anti-EU attitude gained momentum when British membership in the EU was used in some political games within the UK. Although the country joined the EEC relatively late and under some exceptional conditions, this former world power has never assumed the role of the European integration leader. Th e struggle over the leadership of the Conservative Party prompted then Prime Minister David Cameron to announce a referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union. Following an unprecedented wave of manipulation in the referendum campaign, what seemed a mere formality taken to secure his position in fact brought unexpected results. Apart from the total criticism of globalisation and great concern over the collapse of the nation state, the campaign also relied on the idyllic image of the past, presented as the times when people lived a safe life in a friendly environment and were free from the worries of everyday existence. Such distorted idealisation of the past, however, was not the essence of the false image of reality which was created by populists and which tipped the Brexit vote.
British Brexit supporters did not focus their campaign on criticism of the European Union; let us just mention oft en discussed questions of unemployment of the young, a defi cit of democracy in the EU institutions, excessive Brussels bureaucracy and the imposed policy of public fi nance, for example. Th e anti-EU campaign appealed to basic instincts and used arguments based on data which could not be actually proved -it stirred fear and hatred of "strangers", and economic arguments were brought down to some absurd and fi ctional data. Th e new dimension of populism was apparent not in the use of facts and data but in the use of emotions and manipulation engineering of social media (one perfect example is the activity undertaken by a British company, Cambridge Analytica). Th e "good practices" of such populism have already been adopted by populists in other countries. One of the main characters of the British anti-EU campaign is Boris Johnson, "whose clownery sets him as an example of what we could call the idiocy of authority in a democratic society", as Molyneux and Osborne put it (Molyneux and Osborne 2017, 6) .
New right-wing populism has fi nally found a way to present itself as an alternative to the current political system. Adopting an uncompromising rhetoric of protest, populism provides easy answers to complicated questions in a clear and explicit way. At this stage, the main elements are isolationism and an anti-immigrant attitude. In such a political discourse, the questions of economy and everyday existence are less important; however later on, they become the main tool applied to win voters' favour (Woods 2016) . Simplifi ed message and shallow rhetoric used in demagogic attacks on political opponents contribute to the quick spread of populism. What makes a picture of the situation complete is the digital support provided by external actors aiming to cause disruption in Western democracies; it has not been suffi cient to tip the vote in favour of anti-system actors in some places. Once in power, populists eagerly reach for public money to reward their politicians and offi cials with salaries and benefi ts which are disproportionally high in relation to the economic effi ciency of their work -a phenomenon referred to by Karl August Wittfogel (1957) as "beggars' democracy".
Populism has not been avoided by the United States, the world power crucial in the post-war order. Th e phenomenon of Trump's victory in the election was based on the application of several techniques and methods of mass-scale impact on society by social media, which exceeded generally accepted ethical standards. Applying modern IT tools in order to spread the message about political programmes is not a new practice. Barack Obama's double victory was also based on the application of such modern communication channels. What came as a major innovation of Trump's campaign was an unprecedented scale of fake news and automation of messaging (use of bots). Importantly, Trump's campaign staff turned for help to Russian politicians and services, who became engaged in the disinformation campaign against Trump's rival, Hillary Clinton. Th e methods applied by Trump to exercise power make us think about the intentions and directions of the endorsed governance practice. It is possible to observe some risk of collapse of the liberal democratic system even in such a stable democracy as the United States. It is also emphasised that "if Trump's regime descends -as seems perfectly possible -into outright authoritarianism this will not be simply down to its populism but down to the illiberal intolerance of Trump and the fragility of institutions -representative and legal -to counteract that intolerance" (underlined by A. R. Kozłowski) (Molyneux and Osborne 2017, 8; Ostiguy and Roberts 2016) .
Indeed, nationalist and populist pressure on institutions of Western democracies severely aff ects their position in both national and international contexts. Although this pressure undermines trust in democracy, as can be observed in the chaos caused by Brexit, so far it has not brought about any systemic reduction in the scope of liberties of the democratic system. Th e situation is diff erent in the countries where liberal traditions have not been so strong and which have proved to be susceptible to authoritarian tendencies. Th e degradation of the system can be observed in the countries which have experienced long years of right-wing populism governance, such as Turkey and Hungary. Poland under the rule of the PiS party also displays a tendency towards abandoning the system of consolidated democracy.
Th e decline of democracy has already become a fact in Turkey, the country ruled by a politician who fi ts perfectly into the model of a populist leader: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Th e fact that the Freedom House organisation downgraded the political system of Turkey to the category of authoritarian regimes refl ects long years of rule which involved limiting civil liberties and freedom of media, repressions against political opponents and people groundlessly accused of involvement in opposition, organising a legally defective constitutional referendum leading to the centralisation of power in the president's hands, mass-scale purges of offi cials, including state school teachers, and other practices limiting civil rights in favour of obedience to the government. In the aft ermath of the failed coup of 2016, about 60,000 people were arrested, over 160 media outlets were closed and over 150 journalists were imprisoned, as were the leaders of the third largest political party in the parliament; almost 100 town mayors in the country were replaced on the basis of exceptional measures or as a result of political pressure exerted by the president. 5 A serious threat of destruction of the democratic system can be observed in Hungary, where the Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, openly attempts to supress the civil society. Government pressure on the opposition is growing, and citizens, who live in the atmosphere of intimidation, are reluctant to discuss any political topics. Among the countries of Central Europe, Hungary has systematically reported the steepest decrease in the freedom index of the Freedom House organisation for ten Table 1 Th e change in the value of Freedom Indices in Turkey, Hungary and Poland, 2010 -2019 
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Partly Free years. Th e country has been downgraded from the category of consolidated democracy to the category of semi-consolidated democracy. 6
Anti-immigrant and Euro-sceptical attitudes have provided an impulse for integration of extreme right-wing circles in Germany. Th e wave of fear of strangers and deep scepticism towards EU institutions have contributed to the establishment of a party named Alternative for Germany (AfD). Although the party has not managed to come to power in Germany, the fact that it entered the parliament in 2017 comes as a symbolic breakthrough: an extreme right-wing party won seats in the German Parliament for the fi rst time aft er 1945. Th e slogans proclaimed by the AfD remind us of the morose interwar period. Let us just mention that in their election campaign the members of this party openly declared the need of deporting large numbers of refugees and defi ned Islam as incompatible with the German national identity. Th e fear of the growing popularity of the AfD has undoubtedly mobilised the main political parties of Germany to make alliances, including some unlikely ones, and to make diffi cult decisions in order to avoid the return of the rule of the extreme right-wing party in the country with the infamous tradition of Nazi rule.
In the Netherlands, a xenophobic Party for Freedom has won strong popularity and came second in the last election. Th e Dutch system of proportional representation is a serious barrier to that populist party, and at present it seems that even if it came fi rst at the polls, it would not have much chance to form the majority coalition. In Austria, the situation is diff erent. Although the Islamophobic Freedom Party of Austria (originating from a neo-fascist Federation of Independents) has won the third position in the parliamentary election, it has been invited to rule with the conservative Austrian People's Party.
Right-wing populism in power in Poland
In Poland, the political discourse adopted in the presidential and parliamentary campaigns in 2015 by the right-wing parties, with the PiS party as the leader, was oriented towards populist rhetoric. Th ey implemented such a strategy as a means to win at the ballot box -their main aim was to remove from power a centre-right party, the Civic Platform (PO), which had been ruling for eight years. Th e strategy of their election rhetoric was based on the total negation of the achievements of the ruling party, regardless of the obvious economic success of Poland, which was able to cope with the global economic crisis. Th e PO conducted its campaign under the slogan of Poland as a "green island" amid the red sea of recession elsewhere in the EU. Th e PiS party attacked the government with the slogan of "the country in ruin". Prime Minister Donald Tusk (PO) 7 and his government were groundlessly accused of the alleged "assassination" in Smolensk (President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, twin brother of Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS, died in a plane crash on Russian soil in 2010).
Th e level of emotions and intensity of accusations were not supposed to start a serious discussion but to foster integration of socially and economically excluded groups. Th e PiS party was supported by voters who were against the existing system. Th ese were people who expressed their dissatisfaction with the liberal and democratic order, who wanted to break up the system of the Th ird Polish Republic (as post-1989 Poland is oft en referred to in public discourse) and who were dreaming about some imaginary Fourth Polish Republic, which would be a country proud of its history, fully independent, oriented towards an alliance with the United States, and which would emancipate itself from "the imaginary community" of the European Union (an expression used by Andrzej Duda -the President of Poland since 2015, a former member of PiS). Th e PiS party decided to make economic promises to attract the excluded or those who had a sense of injustice about the economic order: a 500 Polish złotys (about 120 EUR) cash benefi t for all children under the age of eighteen except the fi rst one in the family, and a favourable conversion of mortgage loans denominated in Swiss francs for approximately 700,000 citizens who were unhappy about their situation (most of them had taken out loans denominated in CHF at a very low exchange rate; soon aft er the global fi nancial crisis, the CHF exchange rate almost doubled, leaving them in high debt). Th ere was also a promise of lowering the retirement age to attract elderly voters -whatever could increase the chance of winning voters' support, regardless of the economic consequences for the country, was eagerly promised.
In the fi eld of politics, the right wing off ered voters a programme of specifi c racial purity by attacking and denying the agreements entered by the Civic Platform government with the EU countries on the quotas of refugees from war-stricken Syria. In this way, some radical, fascist-oriented circles were attracted to the PiS party and to the Kukiz15 party, a formation cooperating with PiS but not included in the government. Th e language of the public debate did not change aft er the election. It aimed to convince voters that the government was besieged in its fortress as the only power on the side of citizens. Hate speech was in its full swing, spread by public media which were completely subdued to the ruling party as a convenient propaganda tool. Donald Tusk, Paweł Adamowicz and other former or present prominent politicians of the Civic Platform were presented as public enemies. In 2019 hate speech took its toll during an annual event organised by the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity, which had long been attacked by the PiS government and the Polish Catholic Church but had numerous supporters, especially among young people. During the event in Gdańsk, Paweł Adamowicz, the mayor of the city, was stabbed and died the next day. 8 It was the second political murder in the history of Poland since it regained its independence in 1918 -the fi rst one was the assassination of President Gabriel Narutowicz in 1922. Th e tragedy integrated anti-populists and brought a marked decrease in the level of hate speech in the polarised society for a short while. Th e public media, however, continued to present a one-sided message, which further strengthened their perception as an outlet of the ruling political party. In power since 2015, Polish populists have implemented social communication based on the strategy of a "besieged fortress" and "success propaganda", resembling the language of the communist era.
Considering international politics, Germany and the European Union came to be perceived as enemies. Th e British were favoured (and the idea of Brexit did not change that attitude), as were the fascist-oriented and extreme right-wing presidential candidate in France, Marine Le Pen (the 2017 election), and similarly Italian's Matteo Salvini, while he was in a government (a visit to Poland in 2019). Th ere was also an attempt to reach a political consensus among the countries of Central Europe based on the Th ree Seas Initiative, with Poland as a leader, however without any spectacular results. Undoubtedly, the international position of Poland has declined since then, which will probably result in a lower level of EU funds allocated to Poland. Th e obstruction of the EU institutions can also make it diffi cult for Poland to participate in key political and economic decisions which may directly aff ect the economic development of the EU countries. Th e attacks of the governing party on the EU also mean that it is against the European currency. Th is fact may additionally complicate a potential debate about Poland's joining the Euro-zone. Such negligence has some signifi cant consequences, as it may result in the exclusion of Poland from the group of decision-makers.
Considering home aff airs, the governing party has abandoned a relatively well-established system of junior-high-school education (introduced in 1999). Instead, they have implemented a system consisting of primary and secondary or vocational secondary schools, without junior high schools. Such a system used to function in the communist period in Poland. Th e reform has been implemented without proper educational programmes or infrastructure in place -the most important thing has been to put it into eff ect in order to mark a clear break from the existing educational system.
Although the Law and Justice party has such noble and democratic words in its name, it has been applying them in accordance with its own interpretation since the moment it came to power. One of the fi rst decisions made by the newly sworn-in President, Andrzej Duda, was to pardon his friend who acted illegally in the special services in favour of the PiS party; the decision was made before the fi nal and binding sentence of the court. 9 Th e ruling party's dissatisfaction with the existing system of justice (expressed in spite of the fact that the party had been in power a decade before) resulted in a decision to dismantle it. Numerous activities were undertaken by the ruling party, the Minister of Justice, Zbigniew Ziobro, the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, or the members of parliament who voted in accordance with the PiS party instructions in order to attack and to illegally appoint and remove members of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court. Changes were made to the judicial structures at all levels of jurisdiction, if only it was considered favourable for the interests of the ruling party. Th e intensity of interference in the judicial system reached a scale unprecedented in consolidated democracies. It was much closer to the authoritarian system than to the democratic one. Th e European Union initiated the procedures of reviewing the state of the rule of law in Poland, and it was only because of the EU's resolute response and numerous interventions that the presidency of the Supreme Court was returned to Professor Małgorzata Gersdorf, who had been holding that position since 2014. 10 Th e steepest decrease in the democracy index was reported in Poland as a result of interference by the executive power in the judicial system and its independence; the decrease in the democracy index also resulted from the politicisation of state media, activities undertaken against non-government organisations and the violation of parliamentary procedures. 11
In Hungary and in Poland the populist leaders have been ruthlessly continuing the process of taking control over democratic institutions (Sierakowski 2018) . In both countries some illegal or almost illegal steps have been taken against non-government organisations (in Poland they involved the invigilation of some members of the organisation called the Citizens of the Republic of Poland, or illegal surveillance of Ryszard Petru, a member of parliament). Th e values of the freedom index clearly indicate a decline of the state of democracy in such countries as Hungary and Poland, a slight drop in such countries as Slovakia and Lithuania, and a minimal decrease in the Czech Republic (see Table  2 ). It is particularly signifi cant that the freedom of the political system in Hungary has declined -as a result of Viktor Orbán's rule, a consolidated democratic state has become a semi-consolidated democracy (see Table 3 ), which scores less in particular categories of freedom and displays strong tendencies toward the authoritarian system. Several years ago, the leader of the PiS party declared he would turn Warsaw into the second Budapest. It should be admitted that once in control of the most important institutions in Poland, he has taken gradual steps to abandon standards of liberal democracy. Although he has been less dynamic on this front than his Hungarian predecessor, the path he has taken leads towards semi-consolidated authoritarianism.
Th e value of the Freedom Index for Poland in 2018 equals the value for Hungary in 2013. In Poland, the results have deteriorated mainly because of the score in the Judicial Framework and Independence index. In 2018, under the rule of the PiS party, it dropped to the level of 4.25 (it was 2.75 in 2016), and the corruption index was at 3.5 (without any changes in relation to the value in 2016). Th e data from 2018 did not include a number of aff airs involving politicians of the PiS party which were revealed at the turn of 2018 and 2019. 12 It should be noted that although populists gained power under the slogans of struggle against the elites who allegedly won their wealth illegally, they have quickly become involved in illegal aff airs themselves, forming structures and entering quasi-or strictly corruptive transactions (Goldston 2018) .
New populism and the state: internal and external consequences
Th e values of democracy indices in the countries governed by populists refl ect a worrying phenomenon of limiting the scope of liberties in particular areas of social life. Contemporary populism strives for the concentration of power at one decision-making centre. Actions undertaken by populist leaders oft en go beyond current legal standards, generating legislative problems or, in some cases, violating the constitution in the process. Th erefore, the judiciary system has become the main focus of "reforms" or even direct political attacks. Some such examples can be observed in Hungary and in Poland (Bonikowski 2016) . Th e violation of independence of judicial power breaks the principle of the separation of powers and leads to some well-grounded concerns about impartiality in the administration of justice. Th e politicisation of the judiciary system undermines the reputation of the state and comes as a factor limiting the infl ow of foreign investments. Th e "colonisation" of the state by the populist government is not limited to taking control over the running of the judiciary system. Th e spoils system is not limited to positions in the central administration but operates in almost all public institutions and companies where the State Treasury is the owner or a shareholder. Offi cials who support the governing party have become an economically privileged group. In this way, a mutual interdependence is formed, in which a populist leader has to remunerate his supporters generously, and the supporters -who are under permanent threat of losing their position as a result of the decision of their leader or possible electoral defeat -demonstrate their absolute obedience. Described excellently by Wittfogel (Wittfogel 1957) in the context of the functioning of an authoritarian state, such a self-propelling mechanism develops almost slave-like dependence of all participants in power, and increases suspicion, distrust and alienation of the government from society.
Considering the internal dimension, the populist government uses all institutional resources of the state in order to sustain power. As far as public media, or media dependent on the state in any other way, are concerned, such a situation results in a one-sided pro-government message, limitation of access to impartial news, and censorship. Limiting the freedom of media and attacking the media which are not controlled by the state contributes to the aggravation of social confl ict. An extreme polarisation of society aff ected by new active populism comes as a factor which not only limits trust in the state but also aff ects the essence of state integrity. In the long run, a prolonged period of high social tension may lead to civil wars or attempts to disintegrate the state. Hence, it is not surprising that populist parties receive support -whether they ask for it or not -from actors who have a hostile attitude towards Western countries.
Obviously, the protection of consolidated democracy favours pluralism in the political life of the state, but it also comes as an important factor in the development of entrepreneurship, the increase in investments, the development of the civil society and civil liberties. Although in any democratic system it has to be taken into account that radical populist parties may come to power, it is diffi cult to hope that "the invisible hand of the market" will be able to cope with such a challenge by itself, without any involvement of anti-populist movements, as the recent experience has already indicated. Today, it is possible to see the diff erence in the protection of consolidated democracy undertaken in the countries of various democratic traditions. American democracy seems to have fewer problems than Hungary and Poland, which keep struggling, or Turkey, which has not been able to cope with such problems at all.
Negative results of populist governance are not limited only to internal institutional or social relations. Undoubtedly, considering international relations, the prestige of the countries swarmed with their internal problems suff ers a lot. Relations with fully democratic countries deteriorate and some alliances with non-democratic countries -or with countries where democracy is treated in an exclusively instrumental way -are formed. Hence, the choice of a populist path is the choice of orientation in international alliances. Although Erdogan's authoritarian Turkey is still an important partner in the NATO, its relations with the European Union are very restrained, and its EU membership is no longer seriously considered. Ostracism towards Hungary has spread onto more and more Western countries, and some improvement in the relations with Putin's Russia does not have to soft en the attitude of the Western countries towards Orbán. So far, the government of Polish populists has proved to have very little international success on the international arena. Th ey have been instrumentally treated by the United States of America, they have been rebuked by Israel, betrayed by the countries of the Visegrad Group, they have been off ended by Germany and France, two driving forces of the European Union, they have lost their infl uence on the situation in Ukraine and they have not been able to develop relations with Russia. Since 2015, Polish foreign policy has been on the way towards international isolation and to a dramatic fall of prestige, which was restored with so much hardship during the transformation of the social and economic system aft er 1989.
Discussion
In view of the growing popularity of populist movements, it is advisable to look for some answers to the question about activities which should be undertaken by defenders of consolidated democracies in order to overcome populism. Considering the economic aspect, the American experience illustrates how the trap of populism can be avoided. Aft er the crisis of the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt implemented a vast investment programme, known as the New Deal. At that time, American democracy was reinforced and it resisted European tendencies towards a totalitarian or at least authoritarian system. According to Ben-Ami, the source of the victory over new populism is to be found in "a new deal -one that corrects the EU's yawning democratic defi cit and puts an end to self-defeating austerity policies -is precisely what will save Europe today" (Ben-Ami 2016).
Since anti-populism requires an active, educated and open civil society, what is required is vast investment in soft power. Th is means providing support to citizenship education included in school curricula, and to the organisation and promotion of training schemes which will foster tolerant attitudes, counteract discrimination and strengthen the civil society. Considering the infl uence exerted through culture, it is necessary to support events and actions which promote positive value judgments of attitudes of empathy, tolerance and social commitment. It is not enough to organise some commemorative events. One thing that needs to be done is to develop attractive new products that will have a potential to foster social attitudes, such as, for example, computer games, feature or short fi lms, and images to be presented in social media and in other places where support for cultural action is required.
At the same time, the propagation of fake news should be curbed by implementing organisational and legal solutions. In this fi eld, the role of regulatory bodies and institutions protecting the rule of law is highly signifi cant. Some examples of good practice come from Germany, where the fi rst regulations against portals which allow fake news to be distributed through their networks are already in place. Th e fi ght against fake news in the media and social media should be the task of not only non-government organisations but also services responsible for the security of the state, including the police. In order to implement such tasks in an effi cient way, it is necessary to provide proper support and a system of regular trainings to ensure effi ciency in the operation of relevant services. Legal regulations, instruments and training will not be enough to protect society against the surge of fake news. Th e fi ght against disinformation campaigns will require the development of new, spe-cialised workplaces, as this seems necessary in order to protect the achievements of the democratic state against the high tide of populism.
In many respects, fi ghting against centres spreading fake news will require international cooperation. Special services of the allied countries and the NATO have already been monitoring cyberattacks. Th e development of the protection of Western countries against such threats must be continued. Furthermore, it is necessary to develop legal standards, international regulations and mechanisms for the effi cient monitoring of the rule of law in this respect. Th ey should also apply to such business giants in the fi eld of social media as Mark Zuckerberg, the owner of Facebook, WhatsApp, Messenger, and to any other actors whose position in the industry is signifi cant for the security of society. Practices which violate principles of the rule of law for political and economic profi t must be prevented, and this should be a sine-qua-non condition of a democratic country, at least at the level of the European Union.
Some less signifi cant and questionable heroes of populist movements are fundamentalist religious movements. Although they take advantage of all the liberties off ered by the countries of liberal democracy where they function, they oft en attack these liberties, using a strongly ideological reference to the fi ght against Satan. Such a situation does not lead to any social dialogue -quite the opposite, it becomes a dangerous foundation underlying national and religious hatred. Sometimes it is diffi cult to talk about the dissemination of faith anymore because some practices are typical of spreading religious fanaticism, which may very likely bring damage to the Church in the long run, as can be currently observed in Poland. Hence, one should not ignore actually existing problems. For the welfare of the social community, the state should effi ciently protect followers of all religions as well as non-believers. Th e effi cient implementation of the principle of the secular state (laïcité) should guarantee the unrestricted possibility to profess one's faith, as long as one respects all other members of the community.
Conclusions
It can be oft en heard that democracy is the best system ever invented. However, democracy without freedom loses its appeal. Th e challenge of populism reveals weak points of consolidated democracies. Conditions required for the implementation of civil liberties cannot be provided by the election principle alone, because elections can be used as an instrument by the authoritarian government. A democratic state governed by the rule of law is free when it guarantees civil liberties and the separation of powers. Various types of political systems manifest strong points of systemic solutions. Contemporary populism has revealed the crisis of the party systems functioning in the West, and this fact should trigger a serious social debate. Two-party systems in Great Britain and the United States have not protected these countries from negative consequences of populist campaigns. An antidote can be the Dutch system of proportional representation; however, it is diffi cult to fi nd its successful adaptation in any other Western country. Undoubtedly, it is necessary to strengthen the civil society, which comes as an authentic expression of citizens' participation in activity undertaken in favour of the state governed by the rule of law.
